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Abstract
We study the computation contests where players compete for searching a solution to a given problem with a
winner-take-all reward. e search processes are independent across the players and the search speeds of players
are proportional to their computational powers. One concrete application of this abstract model is the mining
process of proof-of-work type blockchain systems, such as Bitcoin. Although one’s winning probability is believed
to be proportional to his computational power in previous studies on Bitcoin, we show that it is not the case in the
strict sense.
Because of the gaps between the winning probabilities and the proportions of computational powers, the Mahew
eect will emerge in the system, where the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. In addition, we show that al-
lowing the players to pool with each other or reducing the number of solutions to the problem may aggravate the
Mahew eect and vice versa.
1 Introduction
In a computation contest, a group of players compete with each other on solving a given computational problem
and only the player who rst nds a solution to this problem will receive a xed reward. To solve the problem, the
most ecient way is to execute a random brute force search across the candidate set, so the computational power
is a critical resource for each player to increase the probability of winning this contest. Practical examples abound,
ranging from tuning the parameters for a deep neural network, selecting random seeds for reinforcement learning
to recovering the spatial structure of proteins and discovering new drugs for cancers [Cooper et al., 2010; Horowitz
et al., 2016; Mnih et al., 2015; Silver et al., 2017a,b].
e mining process of Bitcoin [Nakamoto, 2008] is a concrete example that perfectly matches the computation
contest in terms of mathematics. e Bitcoin system is maintained as a chain of blocks and it awards the builder of
each block by a certain amount of BTC, which is about 12.5 BTC (≈ 79, 400 USD) at the time this paper is wrien.
To build (or mine) a block, one must nd a block header (a xed-length bit string) whose hash value meets a certain
criteria and announce it before other competitors. Because it is hard to invert the secure hash function, the most
ecient way is to enumerate (in an arbitrary order) and verify the candidate block headers. is is exactly the case
as we described in the computation contest and the mining process is now an extremely erce competition — the
total computational power of the community is roughly 48E (4.8 × 1019) hash per second.1
To participate such a vast contest, understanding the winning probability or the expected reward is undoubtedly
important to the players. So far, the winning probability of each player is believed to be proportional to his compu-
tational power (or his speed of verifying one candidate) [Fisch et al., 2017]. eir argument is briey as follows: For
each player, the wins follow a Poisson process with a strength proportional to his computational power and hence
the expected reward is also proportional to his computational power.
However, in the strict sense, this conclusion is incorrect due to the nature of draws without replacement in the
computation contests: Conditioned on no solution has been found yet, the more candidates one has already checked,
the higher probability the next candidate will be a solution. To see this concretely, take the following extreme case as
an example. ere are only two players with computational powers being 2 and 1. When there is only one solution
to the given problem, the winning probabilities of them are in fact 3/4 and 1/4, instead of 2/3 and 1/3. In Section 3,
1See https://www.blockchain.com/en/charts/hash-rate.
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we will demonstrate the analysis in details. In general, our analysis shows that the gap between one’s winning
probability and the proportion of his computational power increases as the number of solutions of the problem
decreases.
Such gaps, if not negligible, will lead to the Mahew eect in the system where the players repeatedly participate
the computation contest. In practice, the reward received now oen results in increments of computational powers
in the future, for example, research groups can aract more researcher and funds by their results and Bitcoin miners
can purchase more machines using BTCs. e gaps, as we will show in this paper, oer higher increments for
those with relatively high computational powers and makes the rich (relatively) richer and the poor (relatively) poorer.
Eventually, the entire system could be dominated by a single player, which is undesirable in most applications. e
converging speed could be accelerated if the players are allowed to form groups or pools where they can jointly
search for the solution and split the rewards.
Our analysis of the computation contest then suggests that keeping the number of solutions large is critical to
suppress the Mahew eect in the system.
1.1 Our contribution
In this paper, we make the following contributions, where all the results apply to general multiple-solution cases:
• We give the winning probabilities of the players in closed-form, both for the single-solution case (eorem 1)
and the multiple-solution case (eorem 9).
• In general, the probabilities are not proportional to the computational powers of the players. In extreme cases,
this may lead to the Mahew eect in terms of computational powers: “the rich get richer and the poor get
poorer”.
• We introduce a pool choosing game between the players, where each of them can either specify one pool to
join or keep himself independent. We analyse the incentives of the players under this game (Section 4) and
identify a non-trivial Nash equilibrium (eorem 4).
In particular, in the Nash equilibrium, there is always a pool (or a single player) who has more than half of
the total computational power. It implies that the Mahew eect could become even stronger when pooling
is allowed. For the application of Bitcoin, it also means the 51% aack2 could emerge in this case.
• Last but not least, we show that increasing the number of solutions will mitigate the Mahew eect. is is
because as the number of solutions grows, the winning probabilities will gradually get close to being propor-
tional to computational powers, where the gap between the probabilities and the proportions can be roughly
bounded by the order of n−1 (eorem 11).
1.2 Related work
e blockchain and Bitcoin are rst presented in 2008 under the pseudonym Nakamoto [2008] and widely concerned
in the past decade. ousands of papers follow the work by Nakamoto [2008] with research areas including cryp-
tography, game theory, and distributed systems. e book “Mastering Bitcoin” [Antonopoulos, 2014] introduces the
basic knowledge about Bitcoin for beginners and Tschorsch and Scheuermann [2016] summarize some early studies
and progresses of the Bitcoin techniques.
e game-theoretical analysis of the mining systems, where each miner performs as a self-interested player to
maximize his reward, is one of the central topics of blockchain researches and most relevant to this work. Rosenfeld
[2011] introduces the aack called “pool-hopping”, where the miner can work in one pool at the beginning of one
round and hop to another pool when the current round is longer than a threshold, and analyzes the advantages and
disadvantages under several reward mechanisms of mining pools. Eyal and Sirer [2018] introduce the aack called
“selsh mining”. In such an aack, when a miner successfully mines a block, he can choose to not publish it and
continue mining based on that block, called the private chain. Results show that a rational miner will follow the
selsh mining strategy as long as the selsh miner controls at least 1/3 of the total computational power. Kiayias
et al. [2016] consider a mining game with similar aacks, where the model structure is a tree of blocks and a block
2e 51% aack is a concept in PoW blockchain systems [Tschorsch and Scheuermann, 2016]. It states that if one player (or a pool) has
computational power more than half of the total computational power in the system, then he/she is able to manipulate the blockchain.
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becomes valid when its height is larger than a given threshold. Eyal [2015] proposes an aack that a mining pool
can send some “spies” to other pools and share the utilities of the spies obtained from these pools. Liu et al. [2018]
consider how a miner should choose a mining pool of which the required computational power is xed. Fisch et al.
[2017] show that the geometric pay pool achieves the optimal social welfare based on the power utility function.
In the famous economic model, R&D race [Canbolat et al., 2012; Harris and Vickers, 1987], a similar seing is
analyzed, where each agent can choose his eort rate to the winner-takes-all competition. However, the expected
prots are still assumed to be linear to the agents’ eort rates with additional costs. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no literature drops the assumption about the proportional winning probability and this paper is the rst to
mathematically consider the winning probabilities in rst principles.
2 Preliminaries
Consider the following model of an abstract computation contest where the problem is solved via random trials:
• m players compete with each other in solving a problem;
• e problem is to nd a solution of h(v) = 0 from a candidate set V , where |V | = N is nite;
• ere are n ≥ 1 solutions to the problem, but only the player who rst nds one solution receives a reward 1.
In particular, there is no trick for solving the problem in the sense that enumerating and verifying all candidates from
V in an arbitrary order is the best algorithm. Formally, let h be randomly drawn from a ground setH according to
some distribution, such that for any v ∈ V , the event h(v) = 0 is independent of the function values of any subset of
V \ {v}. In addition, the probability of h(v) = 0 is the same for any v ∈ V and the computational resource needed to
determine whether h(v) = 0 or not is the also the same for any v ∈ V , both independent of the knowledge about the
function values on V \ {v}.3
roughout the paper, we refer each v ∈ V as a candidate and the ones such that h(v) = 0 as solutions. In the
contest, each player i has a type xi > 0 called the computational power, i.e., the number of candidates he can verify
in a unit of time. e player with higher computational power will be able to test more candidates and of course has
higher chance to win. Here, we assume that each player is enumerating through the candidate set in a random order
independent of others.
Blockchain One concrete real-world example of this computation contest is the application of blockchains under
Proof of Work (PoW) schemes. As its name would suggest, a blockchain is a chain of many blocks that are accepted
by the peers, where each accepted block must have a valid block header pointing to the previous block.
Taking Bitcoin as the example: Each block header has a xed length of 80 bytes (640 bits) which in general could
be divided into two parts: (i) the xed part (e.g., the hash value of the previous block header) and (ii) the adjustable
part (e.g., the nonce and the merkle root). In other words, there is a xed and nite set V containing all block header
candidates.
A block header is valid if its hash value (a 256-bit integer) is less than a target threshold, i.e., 2208(216 − 1)/D ≈
2224/D, where D is a positive number called diculty. In this case, the probability of a randomly selected block
header being valid is 2224/D · 2−256 = 2−32D. In the language of our computation contest model, the function value
h(v) of a candidate block header v is 0, if and only if v is a valid block header.
Since the hash function is deterministic, for any specic block, the number of valid block headers (solutions), n,
is xed (but unknown). Note that the xed part of block header is randomly determined by the previous block and
the system, therefore it can be seen as the random index of the function h, given that the hash function is ideal.
e main computational challenge of building the next block is to nd one of the n valid block headers from the N
possible candidates, or equivalently, solving h(v) = 0. In particular, if the hash function resists preimage aacks, the
most ecient algorithm one can hope for is the brute force search (in arbitrary orders). In the context of blockchain,
the procedure of searching a valid block header is referred as mining and the speed of computing the hash function
is oen referred as the hash rate or the computational power.
3Although the assumption here can hardly be exactly met in real applications, our analysis still applies at some extend. For example, in the
case of blockchain under PoW schemes, the hash function h is xed and so are its solutions. However, as long as the hash function is still secure,
the algorithmic advantage of solving the problem is negligible and every one is searching in a random order. As a result, the probability of the
t-th candidate vt being a solution is still a constant.
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In the classic PoW scheme, such as Bitcoin, every miner has the equal right to mine and the one who rst
announces the next block with a valid block header will win the reward on that block. e reward is a constant
with respect to the mining procedure. erefore, the mining process of each block could be well-modeled by our
computation contest, where each miner corresponds to a player, block headers correspond to candidates, and valid
block headers correspond to solutions.
Pooling In practice, the probability of winning the contest could be extremely low for a single player and hence
the variance of the random reward is very high. To avoid the high variance, it is a common practice that individuals
form a pool and jointly search for the solution. Once the pool wins, the reward will be distributed to the players in the
pool according to a pre-specied policy. e most common policy, in the case of Bitcoin, is essentially a proportional
allocation rule, i.e., the reward a player receives is proportional to the computational power he contributes to the
pool.4 In the same spirit, work by Bloch [1996] analyzes sequential coalition game, spliing the whole party into
subsets, and studies subgame perfect equilibrium.
In this paper, we focus on two types of questions under this computation contest model:
• Given the environment and the computational powers, what are the winning probabilities of the players? Are
the probabilities proportional to their computational powers?
• If not proportional to their computational powers, what is the optimal pooling strategy for the players?
3 e Single-Solution Case
In this section, we start with the basic case with only one solution, i.e., n = 1. Later in Section 5, we will generalize
all results for single-solution cases to multiple-solution cases.
3.1 Warmup: two players and a single solution
As dened in the previous section, the player who nd its rst solution earliest wins. To compute the winning
probabilities of the players, we use real numbers in [0, 1] to index the candidates in the order that they are veried
by player i.5 Since each candidate in general will have dierent indices in the enumerating sequences of dierent
players, puing the indices together, a coordinate of each candidate is dened. In particular, let ti be the index of
the rst solution in player i’s sequence and then ti/xi is the time that player i rst nds a solution. In this case, the
player with minimum ti/xi wins. Note that the ti’s are random variables and also the source of the randomness of
the outcome.
Let pi be the winning probability of player i, we have
pi = Pr[i wins] = Pr
[
ti/xi ≤ min
j,i
tj/xj
]
.
For the two-player single-solution case, since there is only one solution, t1 and t2 are independently and uniformly
distributed over [0, 1]. Denote t = (t1, t2) and let T1 be the set of t where player 1 wins:
T1 = {t ∈ [0, 1]2 : t1/x1 ≤ t2/x2}.
Similarly, we can dene T2:
T2 = {t ∈ [0, 1]2 : t2/x2 ≤ t1/x1}.
4As recorded on https://investoon.com/mining pools/btc, the most common reward schemes in the pools are PROP, PPS, PPLNS, all
with expected reward approximately proportional to their hashrates.
5Here we simplify the analysis by using real numbers to index the candidates. One can of course use the fractions k/N with integers k < N
to index the candidates for an even more rigorous analysis. In this case, our analysis still applies by replacing the integrations with summations.
e only dierence here is the break-ties at ti/xi = tj/x j . eir probabilities are zero under real number indexing but at order 1/N for fraction
number indexing, which is also negligible for large N .
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Figure 1: In the two-player case, player 1 wins if and only if the random coordinate t falls into T1.
Because t is uniformly distributed over [0, 1]2, p1 =
∫
T1
dt = area(T1) equals to the area of set T1 (see Figure 1).
Suppose that x1 ≤ x2, then with some primary calculation, we know that the slope of the line separating T1 and T2
is x2/x1 and hence
p1 = area(T1) = x1/2x2, p2 = area(T2) = 1 − x1/2x2,
which are not proportional to the computational power x1 and x2 (unless x1 = x2).
3.2 m players and a single solution
For the general m-player case, the winning probability of each player is summarized by the following theorem, where
pi(z) and pi−i(z) are dened to simplify the notations:
pi(z) =
m∏
i=1
(
1 − xi
xm
· z
)
, pi−i(z) = pi(z)1 − xixm · z
.
eorem 1. Suppose that x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xm, then the winning probability of player i is:
pi =
xi
xm
∫ 1
0
pi−i(z)dz.
Proof. Recall that
pi = Pr
[
ti/xi ≤ min
j,i
tj/xj
]
= Pr
[∧
j,i
ti/xi ≤ tj/xj
]
.
Let fi(·) be the probability density function of the random variable ti , then
pi =
∫ 1
0
Pr
[∧
j,i
tj ≥
ti xj
xi
ti = t] fi(t)dt .
Since the orders of the players enumerating through the candidates are independent, we have that
Pr
[∧
j,i
tj ≥
ti xj
xi
ti = t] = ∏
j,i
Pr
[
tj ≥
t xj
xi
]
.
In the meanwhile, note that t1, . . . , tm are uniformly distributed, hence fi(t) = 1 and
Pr
[
tj ≥
t xj
xi
]
= max
{
1 − t xj
xi
, 0
}
.
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us the production is zero for t ≥ xi/xm, which implies
pi =
∫ xi/xm
0
∏
j,i
(
1 − t xj
xi
)
dt .
By substituting t = xiz/xm, we complete the proof
pi =
xi
xm
∫ 1
0
∏
j,i
(
1 − xj
xm
· z
)
dz = xi
xm
∫ 1
0
pi−i(z)dz.
According to eorem 1, the winning probabilities pi are proportional to the computational powers xi if and
only if the integration
∫ 1
0 pi−i(z)dz is a constant for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, which in general is not true.
In particular, as we will show in Section 5, the observation above holds even when there are multiple solutions,
i.e., n > 1. Nevertheless, as n goes to innity, the winning probabilities will gradually get close to being proportional
with respect to the computational powers.
However, the larger the player’s computational power is, the higher eciency (winning probability divided by
computational power) it achieves.
3.2.1 e Matthew Eect
e next theorem in fact indicates the Mahew eect in such systems: the player with higher computational power
gets higher return (or higher probability to win) for each unit of their computational power, i.e., pi/xi ≤ pj/xj .
eorem 2 (e Mahew Eect). If xi ≤ xj , then pi/xi ≤ pj/xj , where the equality is reached if and only if xi = xj .
If both of them invest all the rewards (such as bitcoins) they get to increase their future computational power,
the ratio of xj/xi will become larger and larger over time:
∆xi and ∆xj are proportional to pi and pj , respectively, hence
∆xi/xi ≤ ∆xj/xj, =⇒ (xi + ∆xi)/(xj + ∆xj) ≤ xi/xj .
In other words, the player with the highest computational power in the system will gradually take a more and
more fraction of the total computational power and eventually dominate the entire system.
Proof of eorem 2. To simplify the notations, write
pi−i j(z) = pi(z)(1 − xixm · z) (1 − x jxm · z) .
erefore, by xi ≤ xj ≤ xm and pii j(z) ≥ 0, we have that ∀z ∈ [0, 1],(
1 − xj
xm
· z
)
· pi−i j(z) ≤
(
1 − xi
xm
· z
)
· pi−i j(z).
Finally, using eorem 1, we conclude that
pi
xi
=
1
xm
∫ 1
0
(
1 − xj
xm
· z
)
· pi−i j(z)dz ≤ 1xm
∫ 1
0
(
1 − xi
xm
· z
)
· pi−i j(z)dz =
pj
xj
.
In particular, the equality is reached if and only if xi = xj .
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4 Pooling Incentives
In this section, we investigate the incentives of players to pool together assuming that the reward is split proportional
to their computational powers. In particular, we identify a non-trivial Nash equilibrium of the following pool choosing
game.
Denition 3 (Pool choosing game). Let P1, . . . ,Pm be m pools. e actions of each player is either to choose one from
these m pools (say Pi) or to be independent (denoted as ⊥). e utility of each player is the expected winning reward and
if a pool wins, the reward is split proportional to its members’ computational powers.
In the practice of Bitcoin, there are many such pools. e pools have their own websites, cooperatively mining
tools, and reward spliing policies. Usually, the pools always welcome miners to join so that they can aract more
computational resources. In contrast, each individual miner can of course work by himself.
As a quick example, the action prole (P1, . . . ,P1) results in a giant pool including everyone ({1, . . . ,m}) and the
action prole (⊥, . . . ,⊥) results in everyone being independent. Although trivial, the laer is a Nash equilibrium of
the game. Because, for example, if player i deviates, then the result is that only player i in a pool and all others being
independent. No dierence.
e following theorem then identies a non-trivial Nash equilibrium for two cases.
eorem 4 (Nash Equilibrium). Suppose that xm ≥ xm−1 ≥ · · · ≥ x1. If xm ≤ x1 + · · · + xm−1, then the action prole
(P1, . . . ,P1) is a Nash equilibrium, yielding a giant pool.
Otherwise, we have xm ≥ x1 + · · · + xm−1, and the action prole (P1, . . . ,P1,⊥) is a Nash equilibrium, with player
m being independent and the others in one pool.
To prove this theorem, we rst need to understand the conditions that a player has incentive to join a pool (or
another player). With the theorems and lemmas in place, we prove eorem 4 at the end of this section.
We also emphasize that the results in this section will later be generalized to the multiple-solution case in Sec-
tion 5.
4.1 Incentive Analysis
First of all, an important and immediate observation for pooling is that pooling is always benecial when taking the
pool as a whole. Formally,
Observation 5. A pool’s winning probability is no less than the sum of the winning probabilities of its members when
they participate the computation contest separately.
is is easy to get by considering a “pseudo-pool” of the members, where they enumerate through the candidates
in the same order as they do when participate the contest separately. Clearly, the winning probability of the “pseudo-
pool” equals to the sum of the winning probabilities of the members working separately. Since the players in the
“pseudo-pool” may repeatedly verify some of the candidates, the winning probability could be even higher if they
simply skip those already veried by other members in the pool. In particular, this “higher” winning probability
equals to the winning probability of the real pool by symmetry.
eorem 6. For any player i, pooling with another player with higher computational power than him is always bene-
cial.
Proof. Consider a player i pooling with another player j with xj ≥ xi . We use pi j to denote the winning probability
of the pool. en by Observation 5, we have pi j ≥ pi + pj and hence the reward of player i from the pool is
p′i =
xi
xi + xj
· pi j =
pi j
1 + xj/xi ≥
pi + pi
1 + xj/xi .
Note that by eorem 2, we have
pi/xi ≤ pj/xj ⇐⇒ xj/xi ≤ pj/pi .
erefore
p′i ≥
pi + pi
1 + xj/xi ≥
pi + pj
1 + pj/pi = pi .
In other words, player i gets more reward by pooling with player j .
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A direct consequence of this theorem is that a pool is stable against single deviation as long as the largest player’s
computational power is no more than half of the computational power of the pool.
Corollary 7. Any individual member of a pool has no incentive to leave if its computational power is no more than half
of the pool’s computational power.
Proof. Otherwise, once the player le the pool, he would have incentive to rejoin the pool by eorem 6, a contra-
diction.
In fact, the corollary asserts that any player (or pool) always has incentive to pool with a player (or pool) that
has higher computational power than himself. In contrast, there would be a tradeo for the player (or pool) being
proposed:
• Pros: By pooling together, they form a larger pool, which by eorem 2, has a higher eciency in terms of
computational power (i.e., higher ratio of reward divided by computational power).
• Cons: However, the player (or pool) with low computational power may actually takes more than he con-
tributes. In this case, the total tradeo for the player with high computational power could be negative and he
would have incentive to be independent.
e following lemma then provides a sucient condition where the tradeo is positive.
Lemma 8. If xi + xj ≤ xm, then both i and j will be beer o in terms of the expected reward by pooling.
Proof. roughout the proof, we use the notations pi−i j(z) (dened in the proof of eorem 2) and pi j (the winning
probability of the pool {i, j}).
Without loss of generality, suppose that xi ≤ xj ≤ xm. en by eorem 6, player i gets beer o by pooling. In
the rest of the proof, we show that player j gets beer o as well.
On one hand, according to the proportional allocation rule, the reward of player j by pooling is p′j =
x j
xi+x j
· pi j .
inking the pool {i, j} as a player with computational power xi + xj , then by eorem 1,
pi j =
xi + xj
xm
∫ 1
0
pi−i j(z)dz.
Hence
p′j =
xj
xi + xj
· pi j =
xj
xm
∫ 1
0
pi−i j(z)dz.
On the other hand, the reward of player j without pooling is pi , which by eorem 1 is,
pj =
xj
xm
∫ 1
0
pi−j(z)dz.
Note that for any z ∈ [0, 1), since xi < xm and pi−i j(z) > 0,
pi−i j(z) >
(
1 − xi
xm
· z
)
pi−i j(z) = pi−j(z).
erefore,
p′j > pj .
In other words, player j gets strictly higher expected reward by pooling with player i.
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4.2 Equilibrium Analysis
Now we are ready to prove eorem 4.
eorem (eorem 4 restate). Suppose that xm ≥ xm−1 ≥ · · · ≥ x1. If xm ≤ x1 + · · · + xm−1, then the action prole
(P1, . . . ,P1) is a Nash equilibrium, yielding a giant pool.
Otherwise, we have xm ≥ x1 + · · · + xm−1, and the action prole (P1, . . . ,P1,⊥) is a Nash equilibrium, with player
m being independent and the others in one pool.
Proof of eorem 4. e rst case is a direct consequence of Corollary 7. Because none of them has computational
power more than half of the pool, no player has incentive to deviate (leave the pool).
For the second case, we rst show that player m has no incentive to deviate (or equivalently, join pool P1).
We use x−m and p−m to denote the computational power and the winning probability of the pool {1, . . . ,m − 1},
respectively. Since xm ≥ x−m, by eorem 2, pm/xm ≥ p−m/x−m. Note that pm + p−m = 1, hence p−m = 1 − pm.
en we have
pm
xm
≥ 1 − pm
x−m
⇐⇒ pm ≥ xmx−m + xm ,
where the right-hand-side is the reward of player m if he joins the pool. In other words, if player m deviates by
joining pool P1, his winning probability will decreases.
en we prove that any player i ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1} has no incentive to deviate (or equivalently, leave pool P1).
To show this, we prove that player i has incentive to join pool P ′1, when P ′1 = {1, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . ,m − 1} and
player m chooses⊥. inking the pool P ′1 as a player with computational power x ′ = x1+ · · ·+xi−1+xi+1+ · · ·+xm−1.
Since xi + x ′ ≤ xm, then by Lemma 8, player i has incentive to join pool P ′1. In other words, player i gets (weakly)
higher reward in pool P1 than being independent.
In summary, for the second case, no player has incentive to deviate, hence a Nash equilibrium.
5 e Multiple-Solution Case
In this section, we rst extend our results of single-solution cases to multiple-solution cases. en we show that
as the number of solutions goes to innity, the winning probabilities become asymptotically proportional to the
player computational powers. In particular, it means that the Mahew eect gets weaker as the number of solutions
increases.
5.1 Generalization
We start with generalizing eorem 1.
eorem 9. Suppose that x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xm, then the winning probability for player i in the multiple-solution case is
pi =
xi
xm
∫ 1
0
pi−i(z) · pi(z)n−1dz.
We omit the proof of this theorem but highlight the only two dierences with the proof of eorem 1. Both are
because of the denition of ti , the index of the rst solution in player i’s sequence. erefore, the probability density
function of ti and the probability that tj ≥ t xj/xi are dierent with those in the single-solution case:
fi(t) = n(1 − t)n−1, Pr
[
tj ≥
t xj
xi
]
= max
{
1 − t xj
xi
, 0
}n
.
en by substituting these two terms in the proof of eorem 1, we get eorem 9.
Based on eorem 9, we claim that all previous results (except eorem 1) also apply to multiple-solution cases:
Claim 10 (Generalization). eorem 2 and Lemma 8 can be easily reproved for multiple-solution cases with eorem 9.
Based on this, eorem 4, Observation 5, eorem 6, and Corollary 7 are automatically generalized because their proofs
do not rely on the number of solutions.
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5.2 Asymptotically Proportional Winning Probabilities
Consider the probability that the rst solution comes aer t1, . . . , tm for each of the players. Since the distribution
of each ti is independent, we have:
Pr[τ ≥ t] =
m∏
i=1
Pr[τi ≥ ti] =
m∏
i=1
(1 − ti)n,
hence its density function:
f (t) =
n∏
i=1
fi(ti) =
n∏
i=1
∂ (1 − ti)n
∂ti
= nm
m∏
i=1
(1 − ti)n−1.
Let Ti be the set of t that player i wins and T = T1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tm = [0, 1]m. en the winning probability of player i
is
pi =
∫
t∈Ti
f (t)dt .
eorem 11 (Asymptotically Proportional). For any xed number of players, m, as the number of solutions, n, ap-
proaches to innity,
pi −→ xix1 + · · · + xm .
In particular, the dierence is vanishing in the order of O˜(n−1),6 i.e.,pi − xix1 + · · · + xm
 = O˜(n−1).
e theorem could be directly derived based on the following Lemma 12 and Lemma 13.
We use ρi(z) to denote the (m − 1)-dimensional volume of set {t ∈ Ti : t1 + · · · + tm = z} and ρ(z) = ρ1(z)+ · · · +
ρm(z).
en Lemma 12 essentially means that pi is asymptotically proportional to ρi(1).
Lemma 12. For any constant m  n,
pi =
ρi(1)
ρ(1) · n
m
∫ n−1+
0
(1 − z)n−1ρ(z)dz + O˜(n−1).
Furthermore, Lemma 13 indicates that ρi(1) is proportional to the computational power of player i.
Lemma 13.
ρi(1)
ρ(1) =
xi
x1 + · · · + xm .
Proof of eorem 11. By Lemma 12 and Lemma 13.
We dedicate the rest of this section to prove Lemma 12 and Lemma 13.
6e O˜ notation here hides a poly-log factor, meaning that the residue term is bounded by O
(
n−1(ln n)c ) , for some positive constant c > 0
when n is suciently large.
10
Proof idea of Lemma 12 e proof is done by a careful estimation of pi using a technique called the core-tail
decomposition [Li and Yao, 2013]. To estimate the probability, consider the core-tail decomposition of the set Ti , i.e.,
let
core = {t : t¯ ≤ α} and core(Ti) = core ∩ Ti,
where t¯ = t1 + · · · + tm and α > 0 is a parameter to be determined later. Similarly, dene tail = [0, 1]m \ core and
tail(Ti) = tail ∩ Ti . us,
pi =
∫
core(Ti )
f (t)dt +
∫
tail(Ti )
f (t)dt . (1)
e following two lemmas would be helpful on simplifying the analysis.
Lemma 14. Let g(t) = nm(1 − t¯)n−1. If α < n−2/3, then∫
core(Ti )
f (t)dt =
∫
core(Ti )
g(t)dt +O(nm+1αm+2).
Lemma 15. ∫
tail(Ti )
f (t)dt ≤ e−α(n−1)+m ln n.
We postpone the proofs of these lemmas to Section 6, which are mainly elaborate treatments of the Taylor series.
Proof of Lemma 12. Plugging Lemma 14 and Lemma 15 into (1), and leing α = (m+1) ln nn−1 , we have that,
pi −
∫
core(Ti )
g(t)dt = O (n−1(ln n)m+2) = O˜(n−1).
Hence we remain to show the following equation:∫
core(Ti )
g(t)dt = ρi(1)
ρ(1) · n
m
∫ α
0
(1 − z)n−1ρ(z)dz,
or equivalently, ∫
core(Ti )
(1 − t¯)n−1dt = ρi(1)
ρ(1)
∫ α
0
(1 − z)n−1ρ(z)dz. (∗)
First of all, note that the le-hand-side of (∗) could be rewrien as a double integration over corez(Ti) = {t ∈
core(Ti) : t¯ = z} and then for z from 0 to α:∫
core(Ti )
(1 − t¯)n−1dt =
∫ α
0
dz
∫
L
(1 − z)n−1dcorez(Ti) =
∫ α
0
(1 − z)n−1dz
∫
L
dcorez(Ti),
where
∫
L
dS is the Lebesgue integration over a set S. In particular,
∫
L
dcorez(Ti) is the (m − 1)-dimensional volume
of the set corez(Ti), denoted as ρi(z).
en consider the ratio between ρi(z) and the volume of set corez(T), ρ(z). Since both core(Ti) and core(T) are
the intersections of the core and positive cones inRm, hence ρi(z) and ρ(z)must be proportional to zm−1 accordingly:
ρi(z) = zm−1ρi(1), ρ(z) = zm−1ρ(1).
Finally, we conclude that ∫
L
dcorez(Ti) = ρi(z) = ρi(1)
ρ(1) · ρ(z),
which then directly implies (∗).
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(a) e two-player case. (b) e three-player case. .
Figure 2: Simplexes for two-player and three-player cases.
Proof idea of Lemma 13 To smoothly proceed the analysis, we will start with the cases of m = 2 and m = 3.
For the two-player case (see Figure 2a), by denition,
T1 = {t ∈ [0, 1]2 : t1/x1 ≤ t2/x2},
T2 = {t ∈ [0, 1]2 : t2/x2 ≤ t1/x1}.
erefore, the formula of the hyperplane (in fact a line in the 2-dimensional case) separatingT1 andT2 is t1/x1 = t2/x2
and Q is the intersection of this line and the simplex A1A2. In particular, the 1-dimensional volume of the set
{t ∈ T1 : t¯ = 1} is exactly the length of the line segment QA2, which equals to ρ1(1) =
√
2x1/(x1 + x2). Similarly, we
get ρ2(1) =
√
2x2/(x1 + x2).
For the three-player case (see Figure 2b), by denition,
T1 = {t ∈ [0, 1]3 : t1/x1 ≤ t2/x2, t1/x1 ≤ t3/x3},
T2 = {t ∈ [0, 1]3 : t2/x2 ≤ t1/x1, t2/x2 ≤ t3/x3},
T3 = {t ∈ [0, 1]3 : t3/x3 ≤ t1/x1, t3/x3 ≤ t2/x2}.
In this case, there are three hyperplanes separating T1, T2, and T3: t1/x1 = t2/x2, t2/x2 = t3/x3, and t3/x3 = t1/x1.
Note that the intersection of the three hyperplanes is a line, t1/x1 = t2/x2 = t3/x3, which then intersects with the
simplex A1A2A3 = {t : t1 + t2 + t3 = 1} at a point Q.
erefore, the 2-dimensional volumes (or areas) ρ1(1), ρ2(1), and ρ3(1) are exactly the areas of triangles 4QA2A3,
4A1QA3, and 4A1A2Q, respectively. Note that A1A2A3 is a regular 2-simplex, hence A2A3 = A3A1 = A1A2. us the
ratios between the areas of the triangles equal to the ratios between the heights of the triangles, because their bases
(A2A3, A3A1, A1A2) are of the same length.
We conclude that
ρ1(1)
ρ2(1) =
d(Q, A2A3)
d(Q, A3A1),
ρ1(1)
ρ3(1) =
d(Q, A2A3)
d(Q, A1A2),
where d denotes the distance between a point and a line.
In the meanwhile, recall that the coordinate of point Q is:(
x1
x1 + x2 + x3
,
x2
x1 + x2 + x3
,
x3
x1 + x2 + x3
)
,
and with some primary calculation, we know that
d(Q, A2A3)
d(Q, A3A1) =
x1
x2
and d(Q, A2A3)
d(Q, A1A2) =
x1
x3
.
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In other words, ρi(1)/ρ(1) = xi/(x1 + x2 + x3).
Finally, we generalize the observations above to get the proof.
Proof of Lemma 13. By the denition, T1, . . . ,Tm are separated by
(m
2
)
hyperplanes:
∀i , j, ti/xi = tj/xj .
In particular, the intersection of them is a line and the line intersects the (m− 1)-simplex A1 · · · Am at a unique point
Q, whose coordinate is:
Q :
(
x1
x1 + · · · + xm , . . . ,
xm
x1 + · · · + xm
)
.
In the meanwhile, note that for each i ∈ [m], point Aj ∈ Ti for all j , i. erefore, the set {t ∈ Ti : t¯ = 1} is
a (m − 1)-simplex, A1 · · · Ai−1QAi+1 · · · Am and its volume is proportional to the (m − 2)-dimensional volume of its
base A1 · · · Ai−1Ai+1 · · · Am times its height (the distance between point Q and the base).
Because A1 · · · Am is a regular (m − 1)-simplex, the volumes of the bases for each i are the same. erefore,
ρi(1)/ρj(1) equals to the ratios between the distances from Q to the corresponding bases. Based on the coordinate
of Q, we conclude that the ratio equals to xi/xj . In other words,
ρi(1)
ρ(1) =
ρi(1)
ρ1(1) + · · · + ρm(1) =
xi
x1 + · · · + xm .
6 Missing Proofs
e following technical lemma is repeatedly used in the proofs.
Lemma 16. For all x ∈ R, ex ≥ 1 + x.
Proof of Lemma 14. For the core part, because t¯ < α < n−2/3,
m∏
i=1
(1 − ti) = 1 −
∑
i
ti +
∑
i,j
titj + · · · = 1 − t¯ +O(t¯2),
m∏
i=1
(1 − ti)n−1 = (1 − t¯)n−1
(
1 + O(t¯
2)
1 − t¯
)n−1
.
Since nt¯2 ≤ nα2 < n−1/3, then by Lemma 16 and Taylor’s expansion of ex at 0,
m∏
i=1
(1 − ti)n−1 ≤ (1 − t¯)n−1e
O(t¯2)
1−t¯ ·(n−1) = (1 − t¯)n−1 ·
(
1 + O(t¯
2)(n − 1)
1 − t¯ +O(n
2 t¯4)
)
= (1 − t¯)n−1 +O(nt¯2).
us ∫
core(Ti )
f (t)dt ≤
∫
core(Ti )
nm
((1 − t¯)n−1 +O(nt¯2)) dt,
where ∫
core(Ti )
nm · O(nt¯2)dt ≤ nm+1
∫
core
O(t¯2)dt .
Consider rewrite the right-hand-side as a double integration over corez = {t ∈ core : t¯ = z} and then for z from 0 to
α: ∫
core
O(t¯2)dt =
∫ α
0
O(z2)dz
∫
L
dcorez
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Note that
∫
L
dcorez is the Lebesgue integration over the set corez and hence equals to its (m − 1)-dimensional
volume, which is ρ(z) =
√
m
(m−1)! · zm−1 [Stein, 1966]. erefore,∫
core
O(t¯2)dt =
∫ α
0
O(z2) · zm−1dz = O(αm+2).
at is ∫
core(Ti )
nm · O(nt¯2)dt ≤ O(nm+1αm+2).
In summary, ∫
core(Ti )
f (t)dt =
∫
core(Ti )
g(t)dt +O(nm+1αm+2).
Proof of Lemma 15. For the tail part, according to the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means,
m∏
i=1
(1 − ti) ≤ (1 − t¯/m)m,
then by Lemma 16 and t¯ ≥ α,
m∏
i=1
(1 − ti)n−1 ≤ (1 − t¯/m)m(n−1) ≤ e−t¯(n−1) ≤ e−α(n−1).
erefore, f (t) ≤ nme−α(n−1) = e−α(n−1)+m ln n. Also note that
∫
tail dt is the volume of tail, which is less than 1, hence∫
tail(Ti )
f (t)dt ≤ e−α(n−1)+m ln n
∫
tail
dt ≤ e−α(n−1)+m ln n.
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